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Abstract: 
Government's practice of contracting out with outside organizations for public services has become a major 
recommendation for cutting costs and improving service delivery. However, few scholars have examined this 
alternative in terms of the requisite procedures and conditions that lead to the expected benefits. This article 
focuses on three conditions—competition, rational decision-making, and government oversight—that appear to 
be critical to the contracting process. To evaluate these conditions and their presence in human service 
contracting, research in two policy areas is presented—social services (Title XX) and employment and training 
services (Comprehensive Employment and Training Act, or CETA), as implemented in Michigan state and local 
government. The conclusion suggests key organizational, behavioral, and environmental factors that the pro-
contracting argument overlooks. 
 
Article: 
At no time in recent history has the American preference for using nongovernmental organizations been so 
much a part of government theory and practice. Although for some years federal and state agencies have 
followed OMB (Office of Management and Budget) and state directives to rely on the private sector to supply 
their needs, only during the Reagan administration have we seen such a major commitment to achieving public 
goals and providing services via private organizations. In the public administration literature, a variety of 
mechanisms for the privatization of public services have been suggested, including vouchers, contracting out, 
load-shedding, and coproduction of services (Poole, 1980; Savas, 1982; Straussman, 1981). Governments at all 
levels have considered or adopted most of these mechanisms to cut back expenditures in view of fiscal 
constraints and to "get government off our backs." 
 
Contracting out for public services is one of the recommendations that has been utilized by various government 
units for many years for reasons other than fiscal restraint—for example, to avoid hiring freezes and civil 
service restrictions; to take advantage of well- developed private expertise; to pay off friends, relatives, and 
campaign contributors; and to test experimental programs with a minimum of commitment. But in the last two 
decades a new trend has been apparent. Contracting out has been suggested and considered more frequently as 
an alternative to conventional bureaucratic means for a wide variety of programs and services, often in the face 
of fiscal strain. Services supplied by this means run the gamut from the more traditional janitorial and sanitation 
services, to job training and alcohol rehabilitation programs, to highly specialized research and development 
(Fisk et al., 1978; Florestano and Gordon, 1980; Savas, 1982). In particular, the purchase of human services for 
clients has become a more common method of service delivery in state and local governments, often as a result 
of federal laws and regulations. For example, over half the funds for Title XX of the Social Security Act have 
been spent by states for purchased social services, with increasing numbers of contracts being made with 
private, nonprofit agencies (O'Donnell, 1978; Wedel, 1976). In these types of client services, the contractor—
whether another public agency or a private (proprietary or nonprofit) agency—acts as an extension of the 
responsible government unit. 
 
This article examines the subject of contracting out by first presenting the arguments for and against this 
approach to service delivery. Next, three conditions—environmental, organizational, and behavioral—that 
appear to be essential to the realization of the benefits of contracting out for services are delineated. To 
determine if these conditions are likely to be met in the human services, research on contracting in two state-
level Michigan departments is presented. In particular, this article focuses more on the institutional processes of 
contracting out than on the ultimate results of the process. The conclusion notes some critical factors that have 
been overlooked in previous discussions of government purchase of services. 
 
PRO-CONTRACTING ARGUMENTS 
The conviction that contracting out should be promoted in public administration largely rests on the belief that 
purchased services tend to be less costly, more efficiently supplied, and better quality than services delivered by 
public employees (Bennett and Johnson, 1981; Fitch, 1974; Poole, 1980; Savas, 1974, 1982; Spann, 1977). In 
summary, the proponents of contracting out argue that private (or at least outside) supply will lead to lower 
government costs primarily for the following reasons: 
 
 the elimination of waste by the revelation of the true costs of production through competition for 
contracts and the profit motive 
 economies of scale in some jurisdictions through the reduction of overhead, start-up costs, or high 
personnel and equipment costs by spreading supply over a larger number of units 
 the reduction of high personnel costs, primarily by avoiding public employee unions and restrictive civil 
service controls 
 greater flexibility in the use of personnel and equipment for short- term projects, part-time work, 
specialized needs, experimental programs, or new problems without a commitment to sustaining a 
permanent bureaucracy 
 
The anticipation of reduced costs of public services appears to be the most compelling reason for both scholars 
and government officials to favor contracting out. However, a second advantage is also viewed as important—
that is, the delivery of better quality services. Competition among suppliers is expected to produce better service 
performance and results, because a direct monetary incentive exists. To use Hirschman's (1970) terms, the 
contract relationship offers a major advantage over the public bureaucracy, in that it allows for both exit and 





Empirical research in several different service areas has, to some extent, confirmed this faith in contracting out, 
although not all the studies usually cited are specifically about contractual services. Generally, what limited 
evidence there is supports the argument that privately produced services are at least less costly (and, in a few 
cases, more efficient) than in-house services in fire protection (Ahlbrandt, 1973), an electric utility (DeAllessi, 
1974), refuse collection (Bennett and Johnson, 1980; Kemper and Quigley, 1976; Savas, 1974, 1977a, for 
example), a range of municipal services under the Lakewood Plan (Deacon, 1979), and property tax assessment 
(Lowery, 1982). 
 
In addition, advocates usually believe that contracting for human services—where outputs are more difficult to 
measure—could lead to similar results (Bennett and Johnson, 1981; Fitch, 1974; Savas, 1982). Only a few 
scholars, however, have attempted to examine these kinds of services systematically in terms of supply structure 
in the areas of education, police services, and child day care. Even though purchased services are widely 
utilized in state and local governments, only very limited evidence about human service contracting has been 
compiled (Straussman and Farie, 1981). Seldom have the existing empirical works in other service areas gone 
beyond measuring the costs of outside supply to analyze service levels, service performance, and the political 
and administrative contexts under contracting (except for Savas, 1977a; Lowery, 1982). Outside of garbage 
collection, the procedures of contracting have not been studied sufficiently to shed light on the administrative 
problems governments may encounter in the contractual relationship. These unexplored areas of research are 
critical to our improved understanding of the contracting process and its outcomes. If scholarly research in this 
field is to be of some utility to decision-makers, we must begin to identify the environmental conditions and 
administrative procedures conducive to contracting arrangements achieving the aims of improved efficiency and 
good quality services. 
 
CONTRACTING DIFFICULTIES 
Not everyone agrees with some promoters' wholesale endorsement of contracting out. Observers in and out of 
government have suggested several problems associated with the practice.
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 In fact, some who recommend 
contracting as an efficient alternative to bureaucratic supply have suggested that it may not work equally well in 
all service areas (Niskanen, 1971; Savas, 1974). Other analysts suggest that the mind sets of elected officials 
and bureaucrats, as well as various federal, state, and local laws, may inhibit the adoption of contracting out 
(Straussman, 1981). While they may limit wider utilization, these difficulties do not constitute direct criticisms 
of the mechanism. 
 
One of the most obvious problems with contracting is the potential for cozy or corrupt relationships to develop 
between public officials and contractors. These relationships may prove to be beneficial for both sides, but they 
may not produce cost savings for taxpayers or good quality services for consumers. Another criticism comes 
from defenders of public employee unions. They charge that contracting out allows government to bypass state 
and local unions to hire underpaid, nonunion labor (Hanrahan, 1977). 
 
According to some, the ever-present political problem of accountability in public administration is only 
compounded with the addition of nongovernmental organizations carrying out the public's work. Critics have 
claimed that in many services it is usually more difficult to hold contraetors responsible and to encourage them 
to be responsive to the needs of citizens, legislators, and managers (Sharkansky, 1979; Smith, 1975; Smith and 
Hague, 1971). In addition, the creation and implementation of coherent public policy may become a more 
formidable task with the extensive use of outside suppliers (Beck, 1971; Brilliant, 1973; Sharkansky, 1979). 
Planning for and coordinating the multitude of discrete activities of outside service agents may only add to the 
already confusing, overlapping, and contradictory divisions within government itself. 
 
Some additional concerns have been raised about using nonprofit agencies to deliver human services. Voluntary 
institutions have been concerned about sacrificing their private autonomy to receive public funds (Gilbert, 1977; 
Brilliant, 1973; Manser, 1974). Some fear that the growing dependence on government contracts and grants will 
reduce the benefits gained from encouraging a thriving, self-supporting voluntary sector. Others wonder how 
ehurch-state activities can remain separate when many church-related agencies deliver human services with 
government funds. 
 
Finally, critics of privatization have suggested that contracting may not help to get government off our backs at 
all. Eleanor Brilliant (1973: 394) states: 
 
Effectively, the mixing of public and private activities masks or screens the growth of government interference with the private sector 
and thereby makes it more palatable to average Americans. This illusion maintains the myth of less government, while government 
actually whittles away at the essential substance of private autonomy. 
 
These problems or limitations of contracting caution us to examine more carefully the optimistic picture painted 
by contracting advocates. Perhaps a more balanced view can be gained by recognizing that the actual 
implementation of purchased services may not always conform to the ideal process model of contracting and 
may produce some unanticipated negative consequences. 
 
THREE CONTRACTING CONDITIONS 
Proponents of contracting state that the major benefits of contracting arise from the marketlike competition that 
is introduced into public service provision. To obtain a contract, prospective bidders will be induced to bid near 
the true costs of production for the exact set of services desired by the government unit. Given responsive and 
responsible bidders, contracting proponents assume that awards will usually be made to the lowest bidder. The 
essential role of the government agency or elected body is to perform an oversight function. Not only would it 
be responsible for making budgetary decisions and transferring payments to suppliers, but the unit would also 
choose the agents, monitor and evaluate their performance, and engage in long-range planning. Advocates 
believe that the threat of the government contracting with another supplier (or perhaps producing the service 
itself) ensures that the contractor continues to be efficient and responsive in service delivery. 
 
This simple model of the process, however, depends upon at least three key conditions that have not been made 
explicit in the contracting literature: (1) competition in the service environment (or "market") and in 
administrative procedures; (2) government decision- making to attain the goals of cost reduction with good 
service performance; and (3) an effective oversight role by the government agency. Though not clearly stated in 
the literature, these conditions are implied by the writers on contracting and appear to be essential to the 




First, contracting scholars emphasize that competition is a necessary ingredient in the contracting system (Fitch, 
1974; Savas, 1974, 1982). In particular, two aspects of competition are critical to produce the expected 
benefits—competition in the environment of agencies and in the contracting procedures used by the 
government. The service environment determines the alternatives that can be considered by public officials, as 
well as the calculations made by prospective contractors. At least two responsible and responsive independent 
bidders (but preferably more) are required to produce a basis for competition. If no other firm exists to offer its 
services, what incentive does the single bidder have to pare costs and provide high-quality services? And how 
can the purchasing unit evaluate the proposed price and services when there is no direct method of comparison? 
(This task can be particularly problematic when the government agency itself has never produced the service.) 
 
In addition, the procedures utilized by the government must promote, rather than reduce, competition. Wide 
advertising, a clear and complete specification of the services required, and the impartial consideration of 
suppliers throughout the process are the primary methods of ensuring that purchasing services will ultimately 
benefit the consumers. Usually maximum utility will be realized when government officials have an adequate 
knowledge of (1) potential contractors and their past performance records; (2) the services themselves, 
especially as they relate to the needs of clients or consumers; (3) the methods of service delivery; and (4) the 
costs of various components of the services. With this information, those who write the specifications (or 
requests for proposals) and evaluate the suppliers' bid proposals will understand what elements are essential, 
practicable, and sufficient for good service provision. 
 
The second major condition for efficient contracting assumed by advocates is that officials will be rational 
decision-makers who are motivated for whatever reasons (altruism, reelection) to adhere to the goal of 
maximizing cost savings, but preserving good service quality. Public officials first would be able to rank order 
the various alternatives according to this goal with information they have obtained about cost, quality, needs, 
past performance, and so on. Then they would select the best choice—the alternative that would result in the 
desired services at the level of least cost. This outcome, however, depends upon two key elements: (1) the 
common goal of cost minimization with adequate service provision; and (2) sufficient information to consider 
the major alternatives and to judge accurately anticipated performance and consequences of each alternative in 
terms of this goal. 
 
This form of rational decision-making logically should be utilized in at least two critical contracting decisions—
the choice between in-house service supply and contracting out, and the choice among outside sources. It is 
obvious that cost savings via contracting can be realized only if it appears probable that outside supply would 
lead to reduced government costs—and not only in the first year, when contractors may bid low to obtain 
funding. This means that services should not be purchased simply because contractors are available or because 
elected officials may benefit. 
 
The third general condition required by the contracting argument is an effective oversight or watchdog role by 
the relevant government unit—a role that has been treated inadequately in the contracting literature. The basic 
principle of contract administration is that the contracting officials should monitor contractor service 
performance continuously to ensure that the activities conform to the specification of the contract. Where 
contractors are reimbursed for their costs, particular attention must be paid to verifying expenditures in order to 
prevent illegal activities and any mismanagement of public funds. Opportunities should also be provided to 
consumers of the services to express their suggestions and dissatisfaction directly to public decision-makers. 
These monitoring operations are critical for spotting potential problems, keeping contractors honest, and 
providing technical assistance to suppliers when problems arise. For human services (and other services where 
cause-and-effect relationships are uncertain), independent, objective evaluations are also necessary to determine 
if the services are effective in meeting program objectives. These reviews of cost, performance, and 
effectiveness constitute essential feedback information when contracts are considered for renewal. Only by 
these means can public offieials be certain that they are receiving the benefits they desire (Wedel et al., 1979). 
 
This analysis of the three major requisite conditions--competition, rational decision-making to achieve cost 
reductions and quality services, and an effective watchdog role—leads to some obvious questions: How likely is 
it that these three conditions will occur in different jurisdictions and across various services? Since the positive 
expectations about contracting appear to rest largely on these assumptions, what will happen if these conditions 
are not always present? And what can be done to produce these desirable conditions and procedures where they 
do not exist? 
 
As yet, these questions and conditions have not been considered or examined in contracting studies. This 
inattention to the process and procedures of contracting constitutes a major gap in the privatization literature. 
Eventually empirical studies of different services and jurisdictions may illuminate the answers to these 
questions and may help officials to contract out more intelligently. Research may also suggest whether these 
three conditions are necessary to contracting success, or whether others can be substituted for or added to these 
to improve efficiency and effectiveness in purchased public services. 
 
CASE SELECTION AND METHODS 
In an effort to begin examining the conditions of contracting in the field of human services, the procedures of 
contracting were studied in services under two major federal programs—Title XX of the revised Social Security 
Act of 1975 and Titles II and IV of the revised Comprehensive Employment and Training Act (CETA) of 
1978.
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 These major pieces of human services legislation included provisions to allow contracting with public 
and private agencies. To make the research enterprise more manageable, I focused on the process of purchasing 
services under contract in two departments responsible for these funds in Michigan state government—the 
Department of Social Services (DSS) and the Department of Labor (DOL).
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 Although they were not selected to 
be strictly representative of human services, these cases may illuminate some common patterns of social and 
employment service contracting, because the regulation of these federal programs require the states to operate in 
somewhat similar ways (Benton et al., 1978; National Governors' Association, 1978; O'Donnell, 1978). 
However, these federally funded programs may not have produced the same processes and outcomes as would 
more independent state and local service areas. 
 
Three major types of data collection methods were employed in studying the selected DSS and DOL programs: 
(1) preliminary, exploratory interviews with twenty officials in four state departments to establish "the lay of the 
land;" (2) a study of pertinent governmental documents, including a legislative evaluation of the DSS 
purchasing system, and many federal and state regulations concerning the programs and the contracting 
procedures; and (3) a series of in-depth interviews with twelve state (and, in the case of DSS, also seven county) 
contracting officials and twenty private (past and current) contractors.
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 In the last and most critical phase, the 
personal interview with the use of a standardized interview schedule was the most appropriate method of 
obtaining information about the actual contracting procedures—especially as they related to the three conditions 
of contracting—and the viewpoints of those most involved in the process. 
 
DSS CONTRACTED SERVICES UNDER TITLE XX 
Although DSS has been purchasing services from various sources for several decades, DSS contracting 
increased dramatically during the early seventies, in part due to more social service needs in the state, but 
probably (and more importantly) because of the availability of open-ended federal funds (Derthick, 1975; 
Michigan House Fiscal Agency, 1976). Purchase was promoted because it was the quickest way to increase 
federal participation. In 1972, a ceiling of $2.5 billion was placed on total federal matching funds, but Michigan 
was not really constrained by it until FY76. Clearly the social services were not purchased to reduce social 
spending, but to claim more federal money, to increase the number of clients served, and to provide a wider 
range of services to the needy. As with the older title for social services, the newer Title XX also authorized 
funding under the matching formula of 75% federal and 25% state monies for a range of social services to low-
income individuals and families for the primary purpose of reducing dependence. 
 
Peculiarities of the state's matching requirement, however, increased the attractiveness of the federal funds and 
affected contracting procedures as well. Payments to service providers could be made in two ways under the 
law: through straight purchase, in which DSS paid providers with 75% federal and 25% state-appropriated 
funds; or through donated funds purchase, in which public or private donations were made to DSS for one of the 
services and were used as the match for the federal funds. In Michigan, except for protective serviees for 
children and adults, this latter method was more frequently employed for contracted services. Donated funds 
could come from other state and local public agencies, and from nonprofit and proprietary private agencies. 
Usually the contractors acted as their own donors and put up 25% of the contract through in-kind payments 
(only if they were public agencies) or cash (if they were private, nonprofit agencies). Under federal regulations, 
proprietaries may not act as their own donors, and even nonprofit agencies can be their own donors only if an 
"independent judgment" is made on the selection of the service provider. 
 
Since the late seventies, contract decision-making became more decentralized in Michigan's DSS—allowing the 
county departments of social services to have greater responsibilities for assessing need, selecting services to 
purchase, awarding contracts, writing the contracts, and monitoring expenditures and performance. A few 
contracts continued to be made through the state office, but the aim of DSS was to farm most of these out to 
counties as well. 
 
The ten private service providers included in the sample of contractors indicate the diversity of social services 
and agencies used by DSS. The services supplied to DSS clients under contracts included money management 
counseling, geriatric day care, family counseling, vocational and educational services for the severely 
handicapped, homemaker services, housing-related services, alcoholism rehabilitation, health services for 
migrants, and family counseling for abuse prevention. Most of these services never had been provided by DSS 




DOL CONTRACTED SERVICES UNDER CETA'S TITLES H AND IV 
Contracting structures and regulations in Michigan's DOL differed from those of DSS in several ways. First, the 
state's participation in CETA services for the most part was a relatively recent phenomenon. Earlier titles under 
the original CETA legislation provided only limited tasks and funds for state human resources units. Therefore, 
the unit within DOL had only limited experience with contracting for services with outside agencies. Second, 
each year since the 1978 revision of CETA only a small number (fewer than 20) of private agencies received 
service contracts of the approximately 100 contracts under the two titles. Although the federal regulations 
encouraged contracting with private, community-based organizations (CBOs), the state more frequently 
purchased services from other state and local public agencies—such as the State Department of Education and 
local school districts for vocational education. Third, all state CETA contracts were negotiated and administered 
at the state department level—not in the counties. CETA provided funds separately to local prime sponsors 
(usually county based in Michigan), but some of the state's contracts under the titles were also made with these 
units. Fourth, state officials placed a three-year limit on most contracts, since many were designed for 
demonstration purposes. Fifth, donations were not required for CETA contracts. 
 
Michigan's regulation for Title IV youth contracts, however, required that contractors match some of the total 
amount in the second and third years of the contract. Although all CETA funds were allocated among the states 
and prime sponsors according to a formula without a matching stipulation, DOL decided to use an increasing 
match to encourage the continuation of successful projects with local funds and support. 
 
The CETA titles and their allowance for contracted services were not really designed to cut costs, but were 
aimed at improving service delivery by providing funds to the state both to coordinate CETA participants and 
programs and to promote model employment and training programs. These goals were established primarily to 
overcome some of the serious problems encountered by local prime sponsors in implementing CETA, and 
partly to cut state governors into the CETA block grant. Title II authorized the Special Grant to Governors to 
develop and operate programs that usually went beyond the scope of local prime sponsors—to assist and 
eoordinate local prime sponsors, to conduct labor market studies, to set up demonstration projects for groups not 
adequately served by local units, and to provide information and linkages with unions and other CETA-related 
bodies. I interviewed representatives of six agencies that had received Title II contracts for the following 
services: preemployment services for in-school youth, job training and employment services for women, 
linkage services between prime sponsors and unions, and information and training services for prime sponsors. 
The four Title IV youth contracts provided job training for adjudicated high school dropouts, handicapped 
youth, and Hispanic high school dropouts. These complied with the title's intent to fund model or experimental 
youth projects developed under the state government. 
 
COMPETITION IN THE ENVIRONMENT 
Competition for clients and funding sources has not held a strong position in the traditions of the social or 
employment services fields—at least as far as services for low-income individuals and families are concerned. 
Public and private agencies have not considered themselves similar to profit-making enterprises, where the 
desire for profits and growth can encourage competition. Instead, these agencies have emphasized that their role 
is to serve people whose social and economic needs have gone unmet in a particular community. They 
differentiate their services and target groups from each other, to avoid direct competition and overlap. In 
addition, only a small number of private agencies have found a stable paying "market" for their services to assist 
the needy.
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 They are very dependent upon government funds and private contributions—both sources with 
limited or declining resources. 
 
Several additional factors arising out of government policies and procedures further reduced competition and 
choice for contracting officials. DSS's choice to decentralize contract decision-making limited officials from 
going beyond county borders to find appropriate providers for particular services. This was a serious problem 
for small and medium-sized counties where only a handful of social agencies exist. Not only have county 
elected officials resisted using noncounty agencies, but many service providers utilizing a variety of 
professionals and facilities cannot exercise the option of operating in different locations in the state. Only 
money management agencies, because of their greater mobility in setting up part-time and/or one-person 
offices, were able to compete in several counties for contraets. 
 
Second, DSS's donation requirement and DOL's increasing match for Title IV youth programs obviously 
reduced the field of competitors and gave certain contractors distinct advantages over others, even though these 
funding stipulations were designed to advance other goals of the departments. These, as well as other 
regulations, appeared to discourage private providers from competing. Although public agencies were allowed 
to use facilities, salaries, or their own appropriations for the Title XX match, private agencies had to contribute 
cash from their own solicitation efforts or from the United Way (if they were fortunate enough to be members). 
Consequently, most of the counties experienced difficulty in finding agencies that could provide a particular 
service and make the donation.
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 Certainly an "independent" decision to purchase the service from nonprofit 
agencies could not be made, as the federal regulations required, since donation pledges were obviously con-
tingent on being awarded a contract. (Except in one county where the county board of commissioners 
contributed the match, most officials could not locate cheerful givers.) 
 
In DOL, the state's Title II program did not require any match and, despite the fact that DOL hardly advertised 
most of its contracts, the proportion of proposals to contracts usually was about two to one—a ratio indicating 
some measure of competition. Almost all agencies awarded contracts reapplied for the maximum number of 
years. In contrast, after an extensive solicitation effort contacting approximately 600 potential providers, 
officials in the Title IV youth program received only 35 proposals for its 16 contracts, and since then have seen 
a decline in the number of contracts and the willingness to renew contracts. In fact, at the time of the interviews 
none of the private contractors had requested contracts for the full three years. Agency renewals for the second 
and third years appeared fairly automatic— despite some poor service performance—because of the small pool 
of contractors willing and able to fund part of the contract themselves. Although not all the differences between 
Titles II and IV in the number of proposals and renewals can be attributed to the match, this indicates that 
requiring matching contributions has some impact on competition for contracts. 
 
A third way in which competition and choice can be reduced is also illustrated by the DOL case. Because of its 
administrative makeup and structure, DOL was not able to design and implement its own projects when outside 
proposals and suppliers were found to be inadequate. The bureau charged with CETA implementation (the 
Bureau of Employment and Training) is not a service agency, nor does it have county extensions of its 
operations. Therefore, it acted in a more passive role, depending upon other agencies for proposals and 
implementation. Theoretically at least, DSS had the potential of utilizing the county departments when other 
alternatives were unacceptable. (In fact, in most counties the clients used the limited expertise of county 
caseworkers rather than the contractors, and some counties returned certain services, such as family counseling, 
to DSS offices.) In a limited way, perhaps, potential competition from in-house supply may promote better 
service performance under contract, as well as allow the government agency to provide clients with the services 
it desires. 
 
COMPETITION IN CONTRACTING PROCEDURES 
The range of choices for decision-makers can be reduced or expanded each year during the early steps in the 
contracting process—in the selection of services to be purchased, based on a needs assessment; the solicitation 
of potential contractors; and the consideration of proposals (or bids, in other cases). The procedures in DSS and 
DOL were very different and they had some impact on competition and service quality. 
 
In the past, DSS's usual procedure for determining which services to purchase was to notify various private and 
public agencies about the available funds and the general regulations governing the use of the funds. Few 
attempts were made to assess clients' needs systematically, and then to solicit only for those types of services, 
because Michigan had so much federal money to match. As a result, many different service providers received 
contracts year after year with very little review of changing needs or their performance in meeting social service 
goals. They frequently built up their agencies to accommodate the increased demand from government, and also 
established helpful relationships with the relevant state bureaucrats and legislators to guarantee the flow of 
funds over time. 
 
During (and after) contracting decentralization and Michigan's fiscal constraints under Title XX, a few counties 
implemented mandated needs assessments, but they changed few services or contractors. The lack of alternative 
suppliers partially explains this, but the fact that contractors themselves are often an integral part of the 
assessments also contributes to the retention of the status quo. Generally clients' service needs have been 
measured only indirectly— filtered through participants in the social service system who have particular 
interests or stakes in the outcome. 
 
The general rule at both the county and state levels has been that the DSS solicited for proposals or program 
descriptions only when new money became available. Before and after counties gained control of most 
contracting it was the case that once an agency received a contract, it usually became the only one notified for 
subsequent contracts—and almost always obtained renewals every year. Even for new contracts, the number of 
potential providers invited to submit proposals was very limited (between one and ten), depending upon the 
service and the size of the county. Solicitations were based on county staffs' knowledge of agencies and were 
fairly informal—a telephone call, word of mouth, sometimes a letter. The more formal and time-consuming 
Request for Proposal (RFP) process was not required by departmental policy and, as a result, was infrequently 
employed. 
 
Narrow solicitations produced few proposals for DSS consideration. In general, the competition for contracts 
was minimal, according to officials. In all but the four largest counties, receiving more than one proposal for a 
new contract was a rare occurrence. Therefore, in most counties, if it existed at all, the competition was not so 
much among agencies offering similar services that could be compared, but among dissimilar agencies all 
requesting a share of the county's allocation. 
DOL's assessments of needs were much more sophisticated than those of DSS. Department officials utilized 
several advisory and information sources, with the results providing the basis for the solicitations of contractor 
proposals. DOL did not, however, consistently promote competition through its solicitation procedures. Major 
differences in methods were obvious when the youth contracts and Title II contracts were compared. Title IV 
contracts were determined by competitive and fair means—at least for one year— but only minimal competition 
has characterized the Title II process. 
 
Although CETA regulations do not require it, DOL used the RFP process for the first full year of Title IV (FY 
80) youth contracts in 1979. A very complete RFP was sent to approximately 600 contractors in the state to 
allow for the widest exposure and to include practically every possible provider. The package not only included 
performance goals for the projects (for instance, percentage of participants placed in unsubsidized 
employment), but also clearly specified the criteria (and their relative weights) by which the proposals would be 
judged and given awards. 
 
This RFP process, a major undertaking by DOL, was not repeated for fiscal year 1981 or 1982 programs, in part 
because the first solicitation was so thorough and DOL had not changed its goals for the youth grant. In 
addition, the process was very expensive, time-consuming, and complicated. Unfortunately, officials were not 
pleased with the results of the process—either in terms of the proposals received or in terms of the performance 
of the agencies that were awarded contracts. Most of the youth proposals were judged poorly written, ill 
conceived, and unresponsive to the department's needs. One official, who was responsible for the RFP and the 
proposal evaluation process, declared that if she had had a choice, she would have purchased services only from 
2 or 3 of the 35 agencies making proposals, instead of the 16 originally awarded contracts. Nonetheless, all the 
funds were allocated. Since the bureaucratic system offers no incentives to states or officials who return unused 
appropriations, DOL gave contracts to some public and private agencies that were perceived as being unlikely 
to deliver well-run, effective programs. 
 
All contractors who requested renewals for the next fiscal year were given them, even though most of the 
providers had not met at least some of the terms of the contracts, much less the expectations of the officials. 
Interviewees gave various reasons for the failures, including late starts, inadequate record-keeping systems, 
difficulty in meeting the service or target group enrollment requirements, Michigan's economy, slow processing 
by DOL contract administrators, and unrealistic expectations of program offieials. 
 
The Title II solicitation process was more similar to DSS's normal process. The RFP was used infrequently. 
Invitations to contractors usually were issued through informal contacts and letters, but several private 
contractors successfully submitted unsolicited proposals as well. (Some interviewees suggested that DOL had 
inadequate knowledge of private agencies, such that public agencies seemed to be given some preference in 
solicitations.) Some noncompetitive awards to public agencies were used on occasion, as allowed by CETA 
regulations, but DOL generally preferred to invite more than one contractor for proposals. Unlike the Title IV 
RFP process, Title II contract solieitation information was fairly brief and open-ended. Since the target groups, 
methods of service, and performance goals were not as precisely stated, providers were able to propose their 
own types of programs, the number and characteristics of enrollees, total cost figures, and the like. Instead of 
achieving direct competition through wide advertising for certain specific programs, DOL received several 
different types of proposals for different needs and groups that could not be compared easily. 
 
With the exception of some aspects of Title IV, the contracting procedures used by DSS and DOL usually 
served to limit competition and avoid comparisons. In many ways, the narrow search and lack of competition 
were mutually beneficial for most of the key contracting officials, as well as for the contractors. One of the 
primary concerns voiced by almost all bureaucrats interviewed was that they be able to determine needs, make 
awards, and process contracts in a timely manner with a minimum of confusion and controversy. The 
contracting process could proceed quickly and smoothly under the following conditions: when a thorough needs 
assessment was deemed unnecessary; when the contracting unit did not have to reach an agreement on specific 
program objectives, service priorities, or proposal criteria; when an RFP and complete mailing list of suppliers 
were considered inappropriate; when unsolicited proposals were already on file; when only renewals were 
considered and given contracts; and when a thorough consideration of alternative proposals and agencies was 
unnecessary. 
 
Encouraging competition and choice can lead to unanticipated outcomes. In the one eounty where the county 
board of commissioners contributed the requisite match for local DSS contracts and thereby increased the 
number of proposals, the county eontracts coordinator complained that, as a result, the county had to endure 
many protests and the ill will of the agencies not awarded contracts, despite good proposals, services, and 
reputations. Usually more disincentives than incentives exist to promote competitive procedures. When the 
recent fact of declining resources of personnel, time, and money is added to these disincentives, is it any 
surprise that competition among responsible and responsive providers was the exception, rather than the rule? 
Perhaps just as significant is the fact that the competitive process used in DOL for the Title IV grant did not 
guarantee that the department obtained the proposals and performance that was desired, due to the limited 
number of potential providers and the policies that effectively discouraged some from competing. 
 
DECISION-MAKING IN CONTRACTING OUT 
One of the intriguing questions in this type of research is this: Why have officials chosen to contract out for 
services instead of using traditional bureaucratic methods of supply? For the DSS and DOL cases, the answer 
has two major components: pragmatic considerations and policy concerns. Clearly, decision-makers did not 
consult cost-benefit studies to determine the advantages of using outside agencies. Rather, federal policies 
encouraged service purchasing and state situations often made it necessary. 
 
In the late sixties and early seventies, various political and administrative pressures were exerted on DSS 
officials to use outside suppliers to capture the large sums of available federal matching funds in order to 
provide more services to the needy. In addition, the local donation and the expertise of outside agencies made 
contracting out particularly attractive. To some extent, these funds were apparently also used to entiee existing 
community agencies to help the needy and become part of the welfare system with a stake in continuing the 
programs (for example, YMCA, Big Brothers, and United Way agencies). More recently costs of services 
became an important concern, and the contracted services with a 25% local donation continued to look like a 
relative bargain—although not for the reasons contracting proponents would expect. Several respondents 
pointed out that contracting does not make for an entirely "free" service to the state, because many DSS 
personnel were involved in the processing and administration of the contracts. Most interviewees indicated that 
there are other reasons explaining the continuation of contracting—inertia, political pressures, and the 
availability of more and better quality services. They explained that there never was an objective purchasing 
process in DSS—that the state policies governing the types of services to be bought were unclear, inconsistent, 
and subject to a variety of interpretations. 
 
DOL utilized contracting out in part because departments at the state level did not have the necessary expertise 
or agencies for the required and optional programs under the two titles. Clearly, contracting with established 
agencies gave officials greater flexibility than organizing a new agency would have. Probably more important, 
purchasing services meshed with DOL's (and CETA's) version of administrative decentralization—that is, that 
local agencies should be given contracts that could be continued through local support. Under the two titles, the 
federal government encouraged the states to use public and private agencies to promote greater coordination, 
innovation, and experimentation. The goal of cutting costs was not seen as a major reason for using outside 
supply. 
 
In recent years, as Michigan's resources became increasingly limited and social needs have grown, contracting 
out proved to be an even more desirable alternative. The federal funds were available for social and 
employment services, but the state government imposed periodic hiring freezes, cutbacks for state travel, and, 
finally, personnel cuts that affected only in-house supply. For the most part, the early and more recent benefits 
of outside supply arose from the accompanying organizational policies and pressures encouraging contracting 
out—not from inherent cost and service quality advantages. 
 
In the same way that DSS and DOL officials did not use contracting for cost reasons, they did not choose 
among the small number of proposers on the basis of comparative costs for desired services. Except for perhaps 
the youth contracts, the departments often were vague in their service specifications or their award criteria. As a 
result, officials had to make comparisons among dissimilar services, target groups, and agencies—with 
decision-makers sometimes using a variety of different eriteria for selection. True to the incremental model of 
decision-making, officials did not try to get agreement on program goals, but attempted to agree on contractors, 
for whatever reasons. Usually, however, the questions were these: Which of these services are most necessary? 
Which agencies appear to have the capacity and experience to administer the programs and provide good 
services to clients? 
 
The interviews with DSS officials showed that previous state contraets and service experience were the most 
important factors in awards and renewals; however, DOL respondents stated that the proposals' designs to fulfill 
the department's request and accomplish established objectives were the basis for most decisions, at least for the 
original youth contracts. For both departments, however, renewals were virtually automatic and did not require 
much review, especially when a donation or match was forthcoming. Once a contract was made, usually it was 
difficult to deny a contractor another, even when service performance and contract compliance were seen as 
inadequate. Unfortunately, the departments' monitoring and evaluation procedures did not assist decision-
makers either. Not only did officials lack relevant and critical information about the effects of various programs 
on clients' needs, they also depended upon providers themselves for data on service delivery, enrollments, and 
problems. 
 
Comparing contract amounts and pre-unit costs of services hardly was a concern in these programs. Even when 
some line-item budget amounts seemed excessive, DSS officials approved them. They depended on the 
agencies to provide cost and service information without outside sources of objective information. In DOL, 
contract amounts and the budget were not examined or considered until after the awards were made on the basis 
of the proposal. The bureaucrats and appointed officials were not taught to think in cost terms, nor were they 
rewarded for scrutinizing costs when determining awards. One state DSS official who had a business degree 
expressed his frustration in the selection process by saying that most county officials continued to act as though 
they were funding agencies, not buying services. Indeed, the behavior of most officials appeared to be 
more like that found in grant programs than in public procurement of goods and services. 
 
Some of the bureaucrats and contractors also suggested that political factors entered into decision-making when 
elected or appointed officials became involved in awards. When DSS made new contracts or tried to drop 
unnecessary or unsatisfactory contractors, political pressure was sometimes successfully exerted on officials to 
make choices in compliance with the politician's wishes. "Sweetheart" (protected) contracts were made in both 
departments—on behalf of the department directors and state legislators and, in DSS, in response to local 
elected and appointed officials. Interviewees were generally disturbed by this fact, particularly when less 
desirable services or contractors were forced on them. 
 
GOVERNMENT'S OVERSIGHT ROLE IN CONTRACTING 
Successful contracting out would seem to require an adequate system of independent monitoring and evaluation 
of suppliers' costs, performance, and effectiveness. (This last type of evaluation is particularly necessary in 
human services, since the goals are usually to change people, their behavior, and/ or their circumstances.) These 
reviews should be utilized not only to ensure contract compliance, but also to provide feedback information 
when contracts are considered for renewal. In the interview sample, however, almost all officials and 
contractors agreed that their department's efforts were clearly inadequate in both respects. In response to federal 
regulations, officials have independently monitored client and participant eligibility for DSS and DOL 
programs, but have depended upon contractor self-reporting for other matters just as was often the case in 
selecting contractors. In the early years of DSS contracting, close scrutiny was believed to be unnecessary. 
More recently, in both DSS and DOL cases of abuses, more limited funds, and a desire to improve performance 
and accountability convinced officials that better reviews were necessary. But they had insufficient resources to 
monitor and evaluate contracted services properly, due to state cutbacks. 
 
Although DSS interviewees tended to be more critical of their review procedures, both departments had some of 
the same problems-burdensome paperwork, inadequate evaluation measures and tools, and lack of time, staff, 
and travel money. Both departments emphasized client eligibility verification, did less well on reviewing 
expenditures, and failed in evaluating program performance and effectiveness consistently. On-site field visits 
by state officials were virtually eliminated in the last few years. Seldom were clients contacted about the 
services, and long-term follow-ups were judged to be almost impossible to do with limited funds and the types 
of people in the programs. (Some of these problems also existed with in-house reviews, but since the service 
locations were removed from contract administrators and progam staff, oversight was more costly and difficult.) 
Officials did utilize random postaudits of expenditures and contract compliance, but their results came rather 
late—after mistakes had been made and renewals were awarded. DSS officials experienced some frustration in 
the few cases where they were prevented from prosecuting to recoup losses, both in cases of fraud (in one 
instance, due to political pressure) and mismanagement of funds (because of apparent good intentions as well as 
the time and costs involved). Interestingly, for their part contractors seemed to welcome more outside feedback 
and substantive evaluation, if the reviews were done fairly and thoroughly. 
 
Moreover, DSS's and DOL's watchdog roles were rendered almost ineffective by three other factors: (1) 
Michigan's attorney general ruled that contractors could not be held responsible for failure to meet performance 
goals in contracts; (2) information that the departments obtained about compliance and performance did not 
always determine whether or not a renewal would be made, in view of organizational, service, and political 
considerations; and (3) frequently, other sources of supply were not available to meet the departments' and/or 
clients' needs. Consequently, few mechanisms operated to ensure that contractors were producing the kinds of 
services and results that were desired by officials and needed by clients. 
 
CONCLUSION 
It became clear from the interviews that only infrequently were the three conditions assumed by contracting 
proponents realized in these human services. Competition for contracts was minimal—not only because of the 
lack of similar suppliers of services, but also because of departmental and federal regulations and procedures. 
Contracting awards were often made without sufficient needs assessments, wide solicitations, or fair proposal 
reviews. Officials were seldom concerned about cutting costs via contracting; rather, they used this method to 
supply certain types of services to clients. Finally, objective performance monitoring and evaluations were 
found to be woefully inadequate because reviews were largely dependent upon information from contractors 
themselves. 
 
This study, however, shows that human service contracting does allow government units to take advantage of 
well-developed outside expertise. Interviewees in the DSS case believed that, in general, the contracted services 
provided were of good quality; DOL officials were somewhat less impressed with contractor performance. To 
what extent this conclusion was based on actual observation and evaluation over time is unclear. A key factor in 
decision-making and reviews has been a preference for professionalism—as evidenced by contractor proposals, 
reputations, and relationships with officials. It can be surmised that sometimes common professional training, 
language, goals, methods, and biases serve as a substitute for assessing the actual needs of clients and the actual 
outcomes of suppliers' services. On the other hand, common professional standards of behavior and a desire to 
help clients have probably also served as a major constraint on contractors where the government's watchdog 
role has been weak. When resources are severely constrained, as they have been in Michigan in the last few 
years, this kind of check may work as well as any low-cost, superficial review. 
 
Beyond these immediate substantive conclusions about the Michigan cases, this study has some broader 
implications because of what it suggests about contracting in general. Even though the Michigan cases 
demonstrate that in some service areas contracting has not been used in the ways envisioned by proponents, I do 
not intend to challenge the notion that contracting out can be an efficient method of service delivery. Rather, my 
aim has been to begin the process of specifying appropriate conditions for contracting through an analysis of the 
actual praetices and behaviors of contracting participants. Different conditions and behaviors are likely to be 
found in other service systems and, consequently, may produce results that are more consistent with proponents' 
expectations. For example, where fiscal constraints are serious, decision-makers probably will be more 
motivated to use contracting out as a cost- cutting measure, particularly when they are rewarded for doing so. In 
addition, the role of the federal government in the programs studied here affected the goals, proeedures, and 
incentives of officials. Certainly a different policy system would be expected to produce different processes and 
outcomes. 
 
The major difficulty with the contracting prescription is that it has been widely recommended for the current ills 
of government with little explicit recognition of the requisite environmental, behavioral, and organizational 
conditions and the realities of implementation. At least three general deficiencies have been evident in the 
prescriptions of contracting. First, contracting proponents have failed to recognize the critical role that the 
service environment can play in contracting, both in terms of the pool of potential providers and the inputs and 
feedback of service consumers. Not enough attention has been paid to the effect that government programs, 
regulations, and funds have had on creating contractors, encouraging government dependency, and giving 
critical advantages to certain providers. 
 
Second, contracting research has generally overlooked the political, motivational, and organizational contexts of 
the contracting participants. The obvious questions are the following: Why should bureaucratic behaviors 
change with contracting? What incentives are there to achieve cost-cutting or efficiency goals? 
 
Third, the importance of the organizational structure, process, and procedures in contracting has been virtually 
ignored in public administration.
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 Too readily have some contracting advocates assumed that quasi-market 
mechanisms will almost automatically work wonders in providing services, without exploring how and why 
contracting is actually utilized, what procedures are critical in producing the expeeted benefits, and under which 
constraints and inducements the various actors operate. 
 
This research indicates that some of the same problems that plague in-house supply may also characterize 
contractual arrangements, in large part because of the same bureaucratic structures. The realities of government 
mean that this alternative to traditional methods of supply is not an easy, clear-cut solution to governments' 
knotty fiscal problems, but with further research in several different service areas the conditions and procedures 
for successful contracting may be identified. With this information practitioners can try to use contracting more 
wisely and find ways to change inappropriate conditions and procedures into beneficial conditions. 
 
NOTES 
1. For the more theoretical, public choice approach to this general subject of alternative methods of service 
delivery, see especially Bennett and Johnson (1980, 1981), Borcherding (1977), Niskanen (1971), Ostrom and 
Ostrom (1977), Savas (1974, 1977a, 1982), Sonenblum et al. (1977), and Tullock (1965). 
2. For an explanation and discussion of alternative theoretical perspectives that suggest some additional 
problems of contracting out, see DeHoog (1984). 
3. Contracting scholars may not all agree on my selection of these three conditions, yet they appear to be the 
most critical conditions to the usual argument about the process and benefits of contracting. 
4. Since this research was conducted, Title XX has been changed and renamed the Social Services Block Grant, 
under the Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1981, and CETA has been phased out and partially replaced by the 
Job Training Partnership Act of 1982. 
5. Some other purchased services (for instance, day-care or home chore services) did not involve a contract 
in which the government selected the service provider. Rather, a relatively simple agreement about the services 
was made between the service user and an approved agent, with the government providing the funds. 
6. Although many of the contracts in DSS and DOL were made with other public agencies (such as the 
Department of Education, local school districts, local prime sponsors), I included only private contractors in my 
interview sample. This decision was made because of the current interest in privatization. 
7. This is one of the reasons that it is often difficult, if not impossible, to make direct cost and performance 
comparisons between in-house and purchased supply. 
8. A few counseling agencies that worked primarily with middle-class clients were "persuaded" by available 
funds in the early seventies to add services to the needy. 
9. According to one source, some found a way to get around that problem. Agencies (with the county's tacit 
approval) increased their directors' salaries to such a level that the donation could be paid with the difference 
between the pocketed amount and the contract amount. In such a way, the federal government actually paid for 
the match as well as its usual 75%. 
10. See Cooper (1980) and Nelson (1980) for exceptions. 
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